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This thesis analyzes the effects of global economic conditions on Thailand's 
military functions from the 1980s to present. The theoretical model is based on Garrette 
and Lange's framework (1996) of the change of economic conditions on domestic 
politics. The thesis has found that Thailand's economic integration into the international 
economy does not directly affect its military's functions. Nevertheless, the export-led 
growth strategy for the economic growth since the 1980s has created a middle class and 
resulted in a shift of political power among domestic actors from the military to the 
private sector. The role of the middle class in limiting the military's role in the political 
arena has been evident since the people's protest in 1992. According to the change in 
power of domestic actors, the thesis concludes that the Thai military's functions in the 
near future will be less aggressive and involve more compromise with elected politicians. 
Additionally, the military will readjust its role and mission in Thai society in order to 
maintain its prerogative. In the author's point of view, if and only if both serious political 
instability and a collapse of the Thai market economy are uncontrollable by the existing 
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Since the coup in 1932, the role of the Thai military was deeply rooted in the 
political arena. Additionally, without public involvement, political rivalries in Thailand 
had been in the hands of the military and business elites. Economic growth, since the 
1980s, has created the new middle class with involvement in the political arena resulting 
in the shift of power to the private sector. This shift of domestic power further limits the 
political role of the Thai military. However, the prerogatives of the Thai military are not 
diminished from Thai society. Therefore, when the country was confronted with a 
national crisis, people still thought about military stabilization. 
 In order to consolidate democracy in Thailand and to stop the return of the Thai 
Armed Forces into the political arena, economic prosperity, political stability, and public 
education are the key factors. These factors will cause the reformation of the military 
institution from its prior roles to the role of real professional soldiers. The economic 
prosperity has given rise to the Thai middle class. Their roles are influencing the new 
political structure of Thailand. In short, the contemporary role of the Thai military in 
Thailand's domestic politics will be less aggressive and more compromise with the 








































I. INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A coup is an outdated action. The military will not do things not 
acceptable to the people and world community.1 
--General Chetha Thanajaro 
         Army Commander in Chief 
       August 7, 1997 
 
In 1932, Thailand’s political system was changed by the coup from an absolute 
monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. The June 1932 coup was carried out by a military 
and civilian group, namely the People’s party. It consisted of 37 military officers and 24 
civilians. Without the support from the people at large, the coup only brought about a 
shift of power within the urban-based elite groups.2 This shift led to the struggle between 
military and civilian elites for the political power. For sixty years since the 1932 coup, 
there have been 19 coup attempts to overthrow the governments. Thirteen of them were 
successful. During this period, 24 governments were formed. Eight governments were 
headed by military leaders, and 16 by civilians. Fifteen constitutions have been 
promulgated, and 18 elections have taken place.3 Military domination in the Thai politics 
was deeply rooted since the change of political system in 1932.       
The last successful coup in Thailand, before the end of the twentieth century, 
occurred in February 1991. The military ousted the elected government and formed the 
interim government consisting of widely accepted civilians. Intended to consolidate the 
power by the military leader shadowing the interim government, this caused the 
demonstration by people in 1992. After the violent protest mainly by the middle class, the 
military stepped down. The new elected civilian government drafted a new Constitution, 
in order to prevent another coup. This constitution was ratified in October 1997. It is the 
first civilian-written constitution, and initiates a new era of Thailand’s democratic 
                                                 
1 "Chavalit scoffs at talk of coup and his capture," Bangkok Post, August 7, 1997. 
2 Samudavanija, Chai-Anan, The Thai Young Turks (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
1982), 6. 
3 Neher, Clark D., "Political Succession in Thailand," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXII, N0. 7, July 1992, 
586. 
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system. The Constitution makes the military coup illegal by no longer accepting an 
appointed-prime minister. However, it turned out that, the Constitution is not the only 
factor for the consolidation of democratic system in Thailand. Many other factors are 
needed for both the consolidation of a democratic system and prevention of another coup.  
When the Asian economic crisis occurred in 1997, many sources claimed that the 
armed forces might try to come back to stabilize the country. That time, senior military 
officers had assured the public that the military would not intervene. Their consensus was 
that the coup would make the crisis worsen. The perspective of Thai Armed Forces in 
1997 represented their concern for economic issues. Economics seems to be another 
influential factor on Thailand’s political system, which had been dominated by the 
military for a very long time.   
In the past decades, the shifting of political power in Thailand occurred among the 
elites. The military coups were the main mechanisms that brought the oppositions down. 
However, since the international trade is widely accepted as the mechanism for prosperity 
in Thailand, new powerful social groups have emerged. Moreover, after the economy had 
reached a certain level, these groups began to participate in the political arena and 
directly affect the traditional institutions. Some academic scholars have stated that a 
common denominator among causes of coups is poverty, and coups are almost 
nonexistent in developed countries.4 This thesis proposes that since the opening of the 
country to international market, the 1991 coup in Thailand occurred because of the 
military concerned about the instability of the country, caused by the frequent shifting of 
power among domestic groups, and the political games played by the new socio-
economic groups. 
Adam Przeworski argued that economic development under a weakened 
democracy might cause political destabilization, and is most likely to result in an 
authoritarian system.5 Nevertheless, he stated that economic reforms are not necessary 
better accomplished under the dictatorship than under the democratic system. However, 
Przeworski did not give the reason why coups had happened during economic growth 
                                                 
4 Londregan, John B. and Poole, Keith T., “Poverty, The Coup Trap, and The Seizure of Executive 
Power,” World Politics , January 1990, 151. 
5 Przeworski, Adam, Democracy and the market (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1999), 187. 
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periods in some countries. Another scholar, Kevin Hewison observed that the economic 
growth always results in the emerging of businessmen and capitalists, who become the 
challengers of the existing state. The conservatives, the old order and traditional 
institutions, are the groups protecting the state and traditional values from these emerging 
groups.6 Suchit Bunbongarn agreed that the economic development is a precondition of 
political liberalization and democratization. He further states that economic development 
also results in the emerging of middle class, professional groups, and civil societies, 
which are needed for the consolidation of democracy.7 According to these scholars, 
democracy and market economy are the mutual supporting factors. Economic 
development gives the rise of the middle class and civil societies that lead to the change 
of political system.    
Since the integration into the global economy from the mid-1980s, Thailand has 
focused more and more on the liberation of the economy. From the author's point of 
view, the global economic integration and the liberalization of country's economic policy 
will limit the military's power in the political arena. Two obvious examples are the 
military’s withdrawal from power after the successful coup in 1991, and the refusal of the 
military leaders to intervene in the existing government during the economic crisis in 
1997. The country integration to international economy is also an important factor for the 
reformation of traditional institutions.  
The 1991 and 1997 events are the focuses of this thesis. That is, how has the 
international economy affected the role of Thailand’s military institution in the political 
arena? The answer to this will facilitate a broader understanding of the economic impact 
on the military functions, and the future relationship between civilians and the military in 
the Thai society. In searching for the answer, this research focuses on the military coup in 
1991, the military’s withdrawal from political arena a year after 1991 coup, and the 
military’s refusal to intervene the existing government during 1997 economic crisis.  
                                                 
6 Hewison, Kevin, "Of regime, state and pluralities: Thai politics enters the 1990s,"  Southeast Asia in 
the 1990s: Authoritarianism, democracy and capitalism , eds., Hewison, Kevin and Garry, Rodan (Allen & 
Unwin Pty Ltd: Australia, 1993), 182-183. 
7 Bunbongkarn, Suchit, “Thailand: Democracy Under Siege,” Driven by Growth: Political Change in 
the Asia-Pacific Region ed., Morley James (M. E. Sharpe Inc.: New York, 1999), 161. (Suchit published 
various articles regarding civil-military relations in Thailand. He was also among the first academicians 
who had studied this issue) 
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The first chapter of this thesis describes some theories of international economy 
and domestic politics. The second chapter outlines the statistical data on Thailand's 
economic integration with the international economy. It also addresses the impact of 
economic integration on the military functions by using the 1991 military coup as a case 
study. The third chapter discusses the military’s role during economic crisis. The fourth 
chapter analyzes the military reformation after 1992 withdrawal, and the future civil-
military relationship in the Thai society. The conclusion and recommendations for further 
studies will be covered in the last chapter. 
  
A. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses a comparative method to support the arguments and to answer the 
questions. It will mainly focus on a domestic level of analysis, but also try to cover an 
international level. The primary sources consist of official documents and influential Thai 
and international newspapers. The secondary sources are books and articles from 
libraries, official websites, and professional journals. 
 
B. HYPOTHESIS 
The hypothesis is that the integration of the Thai economy at the international 
level affects the role of Thai Armed Forces in the political arena. The contemporarily 
rapid change of the world economy also causes the Thai military to reform itself. Because 
there are many more domestic actors involved in the Thai politics, the role of Thai 
military is bound to change to a new direction in which the relationship between the 
military and civilian sectors will be the focus in the near future. 
 
Dependent and Independent Variable 
 According to the above hypothesis, the independent variables are proportional 
levels of integration for international trade and foreign investment in national economy. 
If the value is higher, the influence of the international economy on domestic institutions 
is greater. Dependent variables are domestic actors, especially the military, which is the 
focus of this thesis.  
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Liberalization favors institutional reform8 and economic success contributes to 
the demise of authoritarianism.9 If the hypothesis is correct, economic integration affects 
military functions. The strong force of the international economy restricts the role of a 
traditional institution. The resistances for change such as from the military may occur; 
however, it will pay such a high cost rather than to concede the institutional reform.  
I believe this thesis will help us to understand the characteristics of the Thai 
military's functions in the future. The economy, the external force, might be more 
powerful in shaping a domestic institution. The institutional reform, especially, in the 
Thai military, might have both positive and negative outcomes. From my point of view, 
the optimal outcomes should be the prosperity of the country rather than the collapse of 
the domestic system. 
 
C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical framework deals with the impact of the international economy on 
domestic politics. The purpose of this section is to develop the theoretical framework for 
this research. The framework proposed by Garrette and Lange (1996), therefore, will be 
used in the next two chapters to study the effect of international economy on the role of 
the Thai military in the political arena. 
The theory of the relations between a state and market has three basic traditional 
paradigms: Liberalism, Realism, and Marxism. Liberals assert that national wealth 
increases by the state allowing free exchange among individuals in both domestic and 
international economies. They also believe in limiting the role of the government in 
economic issues. Government interventions restrict the market autonomy. The proper role 
of government is to provide the necessary foundations of the market such as education, 
security, infrastructures and common currency. Government in the liberal’s point of view 
is a marketplace, where politicians compete among each other for the privilege of holding 
office. Individuals and groups compete with each other to get support for their preferred 
                                                 
8 Frieden, Jeffry A. and Rogowski, Ronald, Internationalization and Domestic Politics , eds., Keohane, 
Robert O. and Milner, Helen V. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 43. 
9 Haggard, Stephan and Kaufman, Robert R., The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions 
(Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1995), 25. 
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policies.10 Liberals believe in the harmony of interests in free societies and economies. 
Therefore, from a liberal's perspective, a suitable economic form is capitalism while, in a 
political institution, it should be a democracy.  
The challenge for liberalism is Marxism. Marxist theory heads in a different 
direction than liberalism. Marxism does not believe in political and economic autonomy. 
Marx stated that the world is the struggle for classes not individuals. Therefore, economy 
is the basic interest of every class with individuals representing their class interest. 
Marxists see political economy as necessarily conflictual. According to the Marxists, the 
economic form should be market socialism and the political structure should be a 
democratic dictatorship. Subsequent to the end of the Cold War, market liberalism seems 
to have won in the economic arena. Capitalism works in a market economy; whereas, 
Marxist ideology is probably suitable only in an ideal world.  
The last main theory in studying a political economy is Realism. Realists mainly 
focus on world politics rather than the global economy. Additionally, economic policies 
come from a political decision in a state.11 Realists argue that human nature never 
changes and the world of conflicts and wars happened and will continue to happen in the 
future. The way to prevent war is to balance power among nation-states, especially 
military power. One form of balance of power is military alliances. Political nationalism 
and trade protectionism are the forms of politics and economics in the Realists’ point of 
view.  
As the world becomes more integrated, domestic politics cannot be appreciated 
without understanding the relationship between the world economy and national 
economics.12 According to the above paradigms, I would like to propose the liberals’ 
argument in the relationship between international economy and domestic politics in this 
thesis. Because individuals are rational actors, they will calculate the cost and benefit of 
their actions. They will also alter the traditional way they behave, if a change results in 
                                                 
10 Frieden Jeffry A. and Lake, David A., “International Politics and International economics,” 
Goddard et al, eds., 26-28. 
11 Ibid, 29-31. 
12 Keohane Robert O. and Milner, Helen V., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1. 
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more benefit. According to economic effects, traditional domestic politics or institutions 
will be shaped in order to accommodate the market.  
An economy can be defined in various terms. This thesis will focus only on terms 
of the levels of economic interdependence among countries. The term “economic 
integration” as used in this thesis refers to the processes generated by underlying shifts in 
transaction costs that produce observable flows of goods, services, and capital. It will be 
measured by such indicators as changes in trade as a proportion of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) or the ratio of a country’s net foreign investment to its total domestic 
assets. Different levels of integration into world markets may influence the character of 
national political institutions.13   
Military and economy appear to be separated; however, they are in fact very 
related. Edward Mead Earle believes that the relationship between economics and 
security "is one of the most critical and absorbing problems of statesmanship."14 Some 
argue that increasing integration into the international economy might lead to the further 
erosion of state power.15 Although there was no conclusion about this issue, the study of 
this thesis should support the argument that the international economy can erode the state 
power especially in the authoritarian state. 
The theoretical framework of relations between the international economy and 
domestic politics for this thesis shows in Figure 1. This thesis focuses on the first and 
second stages in the chart. These stages are an integration period of a national economy 
with the world market and the change in the preferences and the power of domestic 
actors. As this thesis concerns the military institution, it considers the military as one of 
the domestic actors in the first phase. From this framework, the shift of power of the 
domestic actors lead to the political and policy change in the next stages.  
The framework supports the hypothesis of the effect of the international economy 
on domestic politics. In the case study of Thailand, the impact of the international 
economy on the domestic actors leads to the appreciation of liberalizing the economy. It 
                                                 
13 Ibid, 4, 8. 
14 Mastanduno, Michale, “Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship,” International 
Organization (Autumn 1998), 825. (cited in Earle, 1943, 117) 
15 Desch, Michael C., “War and strong states, peace and weak states?,” International Organization 
(Spring 1996), 255. 
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causes the change in power among domestic actors. This also results in the resistance 
from the traditional institutions especially the military. Nevertheless, economic force now 
gains more support. It will lead to the beginning of the traditional reform. The next 
chapter provides a theoretical framework to support the hypothesis in studying the impact 























































































































































































































































Figure 1.   The international economy, domestic institutions and political change16 
                                                  
16 Garrett, Geoffrey and Lange, Peter, "Internationalization, Institutions and Political Change," 
Internationalization and Domestic Politics, eds., Keohane, Robert O and Milner, Helen V. (New York: 
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II. THAILAND’S INTEGRATION INTO THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY AND THE COUP OF 1991 
This chapter provides data and an overview of Thailand’s economy. Data 
concerns the economic integration of Thailand into the world economy. The chapter 
addresses the structure of Thailand's national economy in the international economy. 
Additionally, the chapter analyzes the effect of the global economic integration on 
Thailand’s military institution by studying the military coup in 1991 and the military's 
withdrawal from power in 1992.    
Thailand started the first economic plan in 1961. During the two decades of the 
1960s and 1970s under the military government, the economic development plan 
encouraged foreign investment, and developed economic infrastructures and education 
reform. The strategy of export-led growth in the 1980s also has strengthened Thailand's 
economic integration. In 1988, Thailand achieved a double-digit growth rate for the first 
time,17 creating the hope of becoming a Newly Industrializing Country (NIC). As a result 
of the economic growth, Thailand's national economy has been integrated into the world 
market. 
  
A. ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THAILAND 
Thailand practices an economic liberalism policy, which exposes it to trade in 
goods and services, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and capital and labor flows. It has 
both bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. For example, Thailand became a 
member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989, and the 59th member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 1994. It has a bilateral trade agreement with 32 countries, 
especially a treaty of Amity and Economic Relations with the United States.18 
Regional economic integration is important to Thailand's economic strategy. In 
1992, ASEAN signed agreements, creating the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Each 
                                                 
17 Bunbongkarn, Suchit, “Thailand: Democracy Under Siege,” Driven by Growth: Political Change in 
the Asia-Pacific Region ed., Morley, James W. (M. E. Sharpe Inc.: New York, 1999), 162-3. 
18 Department of Export Promotion, Available [Online]: <http://www.thaitrade.com/intertra.htm> 
[November 15, 2001]. 
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country is committed to achieving a minimum of 85% of the Inclusion List by 2000, 90% 
by 2001, and 100% by 2002 with tariffs of 0-5%. The goal of APEC is also to achieve 
trade and investment liberalization by 2020 despite economic downturn since 1997.19 
Regional economic cooperation is related to the Third World's development strategy.20 
Thailand, therefore, focuses on economic cooperation with other countries in the region 
and the world. It also prepares the infrastructures to support economic integration, such 
as transportation, communication, and, especially, human resources.  
Thailand uses the Board of Investment (BOI) to manage capital flow into the 
Kingdom together with the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) 
in drawing a five-year economic plan.21 Both of these institutions have been established 
since 1958. The BOI uses various policies to promote private investment in accelerating 
economic growth. Meanwhile, the NESDB is the government's main economic planning 
agency in which its economic planning is a commitment to a market economy.22 
According to economic policies, Thailand has become a capitalist country in which its 
economy relies on trade, investment, and labor flows.      
  
B. ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
This section provides statistical data on Thailand's economic integration into the 
world economy, private sector development, Thailand's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
by industrial origin, and capital flow of the private sector and investment levels. The 





                                                 
19 World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review, (Bernan Associates: MD, 2000), 148. 
20 Brooks, Stephen G., Regional Economic Integration in the Developing World: Historical Trends 
and Future Viability (Final Report, Naval Postgraduate School, 1994), 1-3.  
21 Pongpaichit, Pasuk, and Baker, Chris, Thailand: Economy and Politics (Oxford University Press: 
New York, 1995), 128. 
22 Warr, Peter G. and Nidhiprabha, Bhanupong, Thailand's Macroeconomic Miracle (Oxford 
University Press: Malaysia, 1996), 69-70, 79-80. 
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∗ Trade in goods as a share of PPP GDP is the sum of merchandise exports and imports measured in current U.S. dollars 
divided by the value of GDP converted to international dollars using the purchasing power parity rate. 
∗ Trade in goods as a share of goods GDP is the sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by the value of GDP 
after subtracting value added from services, all in current U.S. dollar. 
∗ Gross private capital flows are the sum of the absolute values of direct, portfolio, and other investment inflows and 
outflows recorded in the balance of payments financial account, excluding changes in the assets and liabilities of monetary authorities 
and general government. The indicator is calculated as a ratio to GDP converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity 
rates. 
∗ Gross foreign direct investment is the sum of the absolute values of inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment 
recorded in the balance of payments financial account. It includes equity capital, and short-term capital. This indicator differs from the 
standard measure of foreign direct investment, which captures only inward investment. The indicator is calculated as a ratio to GDP 






                                                 






























Investment in infrastructure projects with private participation∗ 
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∗ Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector- such as through loans, 
purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other account receivable- that establish a claim for repayment. For some 
countries these claims include credit to public enterprises. 
∗ Investment in infrastructure projects with private participation covers infrastructure projects in telecommunications, 
energy(electricity and natural gas transmission and distribution), transport, and water and sanitation that have reached financial closure 
and directly or indirectly serve the public. The types of projects included are operations and management contracts, operations and 
management contracts with major capital expenditure, Greenfield projects (in which a private entity or a public-private joint venture 














                                                 
24 Ibid. 
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25 Hewison, Kevin, "Thailand: Capitalist development and the State," The Political Economy of 
South-East Asia: an introduction (Oxford University Press: England, 1997), 105.  
26 Ibid, 107.  
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Table 5.   Net FDI in Developing Countries, 1992-199827 




























































Source: World Bank Debtor Reporting System 
 
 The statistics shows that since Thailand's economy has integrated with the 
international economy in the 1980s, its economic integration factors were in the 
proximate range of other highly developing countries. As a result of becoming the 
members of multilateral economic organizations together with liberalizing the economic 
policies, Thailand has been one part of the world economy. Since then, Thailand's 
national economy cannot be segregated from the global economics. Table 3 to 5 show 
that up to 50 percent of the GDP has depended on trade of goods and services and FDI. 
The main developing sector in table 3 was manufacturing, followed by wholesale and 
retail trade, and services. This led to the investment by the foreign and domestic private 
sectors in table 4, which includes telecommunications, energy, transport, and water and 
sanitation. Table 5 also illustrates a yearly increase in the FDI for Thailand.  
 In liberals’ objectives, economic interdependence will bring prosperity to 
Thailand. Nonetheless, the optimistic result does not easily occur.  The theoretical 
approach in Chapter I proposes the effect of the economic integration on domestic 
politics. Economic liberalization is a significant force, which changes the preferences and 
power in domestic actors. Since this thesis concerns the military institution, the research 
discusses the effects of economic integration on the military's functions and the 
relationships between the military and the society in the following sections.    
                                                 
27 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "Global Development Finance, 1999," 
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C. THE 1991 COUP 
As stated in the introduction, Thailand had spent more than sixty years trying to 
establish its democratic system with military domination. Although, a student uprising in 
1973 was the first event when demonstrations influenced politics and led to the retreat of 
the long-standing military regime, the request for liberalizing politics and the struggle for 
power were not ended. After the short period of "open politics" in 1973-1976, Thailand 
between 1976 and 1988 was controlled by an elected government, which had relied 
heavily on the support of the Armed Forces since the military coup in 1976. The most 
influential leader in this period was General Prem Tinsulanond (1980-1988). During his 
administration, most of the cabinets were active or retired military and civilian 
bureaucrats.28 The eight years under his administration, Thai politics had been regarded 
as "semi democracy." Meanwhile, in the economic realm, General Prem had strengthened 
the export-led growth strategy promoting Thai economy to the world and improving 
social living. 
Following the period of economic development under the military-dominated 
government, politics in Thailand was transitioning into the following significant event. In  
1988, Chatichai Choonhavan, a retired general, was the first elected politician to form a 
civilian government. During Chatichai’s administration, economic growth in Thailand 
was rising more than 10% per year; however, the new elected government could not 
sustain political stability without support from the Armed Forces. On February 23, 1991, 
the National Peace-keeping Council (NPKC) led by the supreme commander, General 
Sunthorn Kongsompong including the Army, Navy and Air Force chiefs ousted 
Chatichai’s government. The main reasons given for the coup were pervasive corruption, 
abuse of the civil service, an attempt to "destroy" the military, and assassination plots 
against those in "the high place"29 (according to the Army, the target of the assassination 
included the Queen, General Prem Tinsulanond, and General Arthit Kamlangek, a former 
Supreme Commander of the Thai Armed Forces). Whatever the true reason is, the coup 
surprised most politicians, political observers, and academicians. The transitioning to a 
                                                 
28 Laothamatas, Anek, "Business and Politics in Thailand,"Asian Survey, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, April 
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parliamentary democracy convinced many people that a coup was a thing of the past, 
which would rarely occur in Thailand.30  After the coup, the NPKC appointed Anand 
Punyarachun, a diplomat-turned-business leader, as prime minister. The military 
promised to promulgate a new Constitution and hold general elections within a year. The 
junta needed a civilian government and a leader who was well-respected in the 
international community. Interesting enough, Anand was known as a liberal and 
antimilitary in his thinking.31  
However, this thesis does not intend to find the main reason for the military 
staging the coup in 1991, rather it identifies the structural effect of economic integration 
on Thailand's military and the downfall of the military regime in the following year. The 
thesis uses the theoretical framework of changes in the preferences and the power of the 
domestic actors in Figure 1 as a pattern of the political event in Thailand.  
According to economic integration, the private sector has become a significant 
player in economic society, which had long been in the hands of the military, bureaucrats, 
and technocrats. In 1979, there were only four provincial chambers of commerce, but by 
1987 there were 72 of them. Meanwhile, in Bangkok, there were more than 200 
Bangkok-based trade associations and chambers of commerce. These groups had become 
the significant players in interest-based lobbying. Moreover, formal business-government 
relations had established itself in the form of the Joint Public-Private Consultative 
Committee (JPPCC) in 1981. The JPPCC was a forum for the government and business 
leaders, including the prime minister, the minister responsible for economic matters, the 
representative of banking, industries, and commerce associations, and a secretariat of the 
National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB).32 The JPPCC linked the 
economic bureaucracies with the business associations prevailing during Prem's cabinet. 
However, during Prem administration, the power of both parties and interest groups were 
limited by the military.  
                                                 
30 Bunbongkarn, Suchit, "Thailand in 1991: Coping with Military Guardianship," Asian Survey, Vol. 
XXXII, No. 2, February 1992, 131-132. 
31 Ibid, 133. 
32 Hewison, Kevin, "Of regime, state and pluralities: Thai politics enters the 1990s," Southeast Asia in 
the 1990s: Authoritarianism, democracy and capitalism, eds., Hewison, Kevin, Garry, Rodan and 
Robinson, Richard (Australia: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, 1993), 178. 
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General Chatichai formed the first elected government after the "semi-
democracy" period. He started to appoint politicians or wealthy party backers to his 
Cabinet. He weakened the bureaucracy especially downgrading the powerful NESDB, 
which had a policy-setting role under General Prem, to an advisory role. The government 
also relied much less on the previous JPPCC system. The bureaucratic and technocratic 
system, which was created in the 1970s, was challenged by the new elected government 
and the business-backed parties. With the tradition of a vote-buying system, Thai politics 
gave rise to closer relations between politicians and the private sector.33 Anek 
Laothamatas suggests that according to economic growth, there were two new forms of 
increasing political influence by business groups. First, business directly participates in 
the Parliament through elections and supports the parties. Second, there was group-based 
lobbying in the JPPCC system. He also points out that business became a nonbureaucratic 
force rather than the monarchy, which is allowed a substantial share in public policy 
making.34    
Arguably, during the Chatichai administration, the economy shifted toward the 
civilian sector. According to the market mechanism, therefore, Thailand's "bureaucratic 
polity," the term used by Fred Riggs in the 1960s to refer to a political system dominated 
by the bureaucracy, had been changed. The power of the bureaucracy, which had long 
dominated the political institution in Thailand, was reduced. The business sector became 
more powerful in political arena. The vote buying in the electoral system brought many 
local tycoons, who were not professional politicians, into the cabinet. At that time, 
Chatichai's Cabinet was composed of more than 70% businessmen, the highest amount 
compared with other cabinets in the past.35 Civilians were appointed to key economic 
posts that had been controlled by military leaders. This increased the tense atmosphere 
                                                 
33 Haggard, Stephan and Kaufman, Robert R., The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 242-247. 
34 Laothamatas, Anek, "Business and Politics in Thailand," Asian Survey, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, April 
1988, 452, 470. (Anek Laothamatas is a member of the faculty of political science at Thammasat 
University, Thailand. He published articles and publications regarding government-business relations and 
the interaction between economic development and democratization in Thailand.)  
35 Pongpaichit, Pasuk, and Baker, Chris, Thailand: Economy and Politics (Oxford University Press: 
New York, 1995), 339. 
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between the elected government and military leaders.36 Furthermore, the new 
government in 1989 wanted to amend the Constitution that would allow the president of 
the elected House of Representatives to act as president of the National Assembly. 
Previously, a president of an appointed Senate, a military-dominated figure, held this 
position. The amendment would shift power toward the parties.37 The military saw the 
transferring of economic power and political change as a threat to its autonomy and 
power in Thai society. With the Cabinet's corruption, the military accused the 
government and staged a coup in 1991. The coup was widely supported by the business 
sector and the public at the beginning.    
Kevin Hewison stated in his article that in the 1991 coup, state officials and, 
especially, the military, had made a last effort to conserve their state against the 
capitalist’s class movement.38 In addition, he argued that the 1991 military coup was an 
attack on the civilian-dominated parliamentary regime and its associated political space 
(or civil society). The main objectives were to bring decision-making back into the 
bureaucracy and maintain the conservative capitalist state in the form of a civilian 
government and parliamentary regime.39 Scott Christensen also argued that the coup 
came from the military officers who saw themselves as guardians of moral politics; the 
inability of the civilian government to address social issues; and, especially, the rapid 
change of industrialization.40 According to these analysts, the military staged a coup in 
1991 because they saw the shift of power as a threat to the autonomy and power of the 
military institution. The military, which had long dominated Thai politics, was challenged 
by the emerging business groups. Bringing the old mechanism was the way to stop the 
growing influences. Appointing Anand as head of civilian government after a coup was a 
                                                 
36 Warr, Peter G. and Nidhiprabha, Bhanupong, Thailand's Macroeconomic Miracle (Malaysia: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 17. 
37 Laothamatas, Anek, "Business and Politics in Thailand," Asian Survey, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, April 
1988, 244. 
38 Hewison, Kevin, "Of regime, state and pluralities: Thai politics enters the 1990s," Southeast Asia in 
the 1990s: Authoritarianism, democracy and capitalism, eds., Kevin Hewison, Rodan Garry, and Richard 
Robinson (Australia: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, 1993), 180. 
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notable point in which the military realized that it could not centralize the power as in the 
past.  
Suchit Bunbongkarn stated that after the coup, some observers suspected that the 
NPKC would try to influence the election and back one of its leaders for the prime 
ministership.41 They did not believe that the NPKC wanted to resolve the country's 
political problems rather than consolidating its power. An attempt to nominate one of the 
NPKC's leaders to be a prime minister after the election in 1992, therefore, led to a 
protest of the urban middle class and the downfall of the military regime. The following 
paragraphs analyze the retreat of the NPKC regarding the effect of economic 
development.   
  
D. THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MILITARY REGIME 
The student and public uprising in 1973 was the first time that the people rejected 
the authoritarian regime. But, in 1976, the military staged a coup and came back into 
power until the 1988 election. For fifteen years without a successful coup, this bloodless 
coup in 1991 surprised many people. Moreover, in the past model, the military regime 
would stay in power for a certain period of time until the next coup. The rapid collapse of 
the NPKC by the public and the unpleasant relationship between the military and urban 
society during 1992 had rarely happened in Thai society. 
Within one year after the coup, the NPKC handed power to the people through 
general elections in March 1992, but the election resulted in trouble. Narong Wongwan, 
the leader of the majority winning party, who should have been the new Prime Minister, 
was accused by the US government of having links with drug trafficking. The NPKC, 
which had an advisory role in the interim government, took a risk by nominating General 
Suchinda Kraprayoon, the Army Chief and the deputy NPKC leader, to be the new Prime 
Minister.   
A few weeks after General Suchinda's appointment, the protest movement led by 
the middle class and professional people started. It was the largest protest since 1973, 
with an estimated half-million people involved. The conflict reached its climax from May 
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17th through the 19th when the military opened fire on the demonstrators. More than a 
hundred protesters were reportedly killed and several hundred were injured. Finally, his 
Majesty the King intervened by instructing General Suchinda, a non elected prime 
minister, and Major General Chamlong Srimuang, the movement's leader, who was the 
former Bangkok governor, and the leader of the Palangdham Party, to end the 
confrontation by "reconciliation and not by the use of force."42 This resulted in the 
resignation of General Suchinda from office and a new national election was held in 
September.     
During the economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, the middle class had 
emerged from the private economic sector. Since then, there has been the expansion of 
professionals and middle-class employees. In 1937 there were fewer than 50,000 
professionals listed in the national census, increasing to over 350,000 in 1960 and to 2.35 
million in 1990.43 The importance of the middle class is evident from the 1992 protest. 
The "mobile-phone mob", "with the Volvo or Mercedes Benz parked nearby and mobile 
phone in hand,"44 rejected the nomination of General Suchinda. Data showed that two-
thirds of the demonstrators had academic degrees. Sixty-percent worked in the private 
sector and 86 percent had incomes in excess of 5,000 baht (in 1992, 1 dollar was about 25 
baht) per month, with half of them having an income excess of 10,000 baht.45 It seemed 
that "free markets" had given to the rise to middle and business classes revolting against 
the military regime. Many analysts agree that economic development is the key factor in 
accelerating political influences over these emerging business and middle classes.46  
The 1992 protest developed the new political groups in Thai society, which truly 
emerged from its economic growth. Thailand politics is now closely linked with its 
economy. The integration of national economy to the world economy encouraged 
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liberalized politics. The emerging business groups and the middle class could influence 
on the political arena. The military, which has long been the main dominator in Thai 
politics is challenged by these "new social forces," such as environmental, organized 
labor, intellectuals, and, particularly, business.47     
 




 Labor force 
 Per capita income 
 Registered motor vehicles 
 Tertiary students 




 38 m (1970) 
 27 m (1986) 
 16,000 baht (1982) 
 692,738 (1970) 
 55,315 (1970) 
 ~ 200 (1978) 
 22 (1968) 
  
 58 m (1993) 
 32 m (1991) 
 44,095 baht (1991) 
 7,964,969 (1991) 
 423,976 (1990) 
 713 (1990) 





Table 7.   Employees with secondary and higher education in professional, administrative 
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As shown in these two tables, Thailand's economic development led to 
complexity and a shift of power in the society. A high percentage of people in the 
bureaucracy in 1970 was reduced comparably with the rise of proportional employees in 
the private sector. Today, Thailand continues to undergo an extensive capitalist economic 
revolution and capitalists are firmly in control of the economy. However, the capitalist 
state does not demand a particular kind of regime. Capitalist economic activity evidently 
operates effectively either under an authoritarian or liberal democratic regime.50 
Therefore, the question now is why the Thai business and middle classes needed the 
political reform in 1992 and why they waited one year in order to start the protest?  
The answer is possibly the appointing of Anand Panyarachun as Prime Minister 
after the coup. Anand was regarded as a professional diplomat and renowned 
businessman. His name held a guaranty for the foreign investors and business sectors 
especially in Bangkok. In addition to the appointment of Anand, the NPKC promised the 
new election within a year. Therefore, the business sector and middle class waited to see 
the military's action after the election. After the March election, the military regime 
intended to legitimize its authority by nominating General Suchinda to be the Prime 
Minister in place of tycoon Narong. This time, the civilian sector realized that the 
military wanted to consolidate its legitimacy. This led to one of the largest protests in 
Thai history.  
 According to the Anand administration, businesses would continue to accept 
military dominance in the interests of investors and Anand’s name would continue to 
guarantee economic stability. Meanwhile, General Suchinda, the Army Commander-in-
Chief, was considered a professional military officer in the perception of the urban 
business groups. Pasuk Pongpaichit stated, "organized modern business came to see that 
authoritarian bent on fascism could have ... disastrous effects on their business interests. 
The immediate reaction was for the first time to give open support as institutions to the  
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parliamentary democratic system."51 In Pasuk’s view, the military threatened business 
leaders' economic interests. The business groups found that the "coup" was damaging for 
an economy, which had become highly reliant on exports, foreign investment, and 
tourism.52 Additionally, Anek argued that in 1991 the middle class did not object to the 
coup because the Chatichai government was seen as corrupt and incompetent. However, 
the middle class rejected the military in the following year when it was clear that the 
military intended to consolidate its own political position for personal and economic 
interest.53  
Another factor for the collapse of the NPKC was international critics. The coup 
had met strong criticism by European countries and the United States. Following the 
coup, the U.S. government suspended foreign aid, investment and other programs to 
Thailand.54 The United States also cut off $16.4 million in development aid to Thailand, 
while Japan announced that there would be no new foreign assistance for the time being. 
Thai and foreign businessmen worried that the delay of the election could affect 
Thailand's economic growth by scaring away foreign investors and tourists.55 Moreover, 
during the democratic demonstration, the images of soldiers shooting the protesters had 
been broadcasted around the world on BBC and CNN. Tourists left hotels in Bangkok 
after the brutal clash.56 The US government warned tourists to stay away.57 All of these 
factors limited the autonomy of the military since it staged the coup. The NPKC could 
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not stay in power any longer according to both domestic and international influences. 
They had to step down.   
The most important actors in 1992 for Thai society were the business and middle 
classes. They started to propose legitimate authority in influencing both politics and 
economics in Thailand, which has long been in the military and bureaucracy's hands. I 
would argue that in the future these groups would limit the military's role in the political 
arena. Economic integration created the middle class and could influence the preferences 
of domestic actors. A military coup, now, seems to be an anachronistic instrument of the 
military in preserving the Thai's "bureaucratic polity." The intervention of his Majesty the 
King, according to some analysts represented another attempt to save the military 
institution.58 However, his authority and the loyalty among the Thai military and society 
were able to peacefully stop the confrontation between the military and protesters.   
Thailand's economy has become larger, more complex, and more closely 
linked to the world economy. Such an economic system can progress 
further only within a liberal economic and political framework, which 
permits everyone the freedom to participate and to organize to claim their 
economic rights...Thailand has become a complex, plural society. The 
democratic system ... provides every individual an equal opportunity to 
voice opinions and to participate in determining the future courses of the 
country without domination by any one privileged group.59 
In summary, the military coup in 1991 can be viewed as a resistance of the 
military to the shift of power among domestic actors in Figure 1. Meanwhile, the people's 
protest in 1992 could be regarded as the new social forces in Thai politics, which limit 
the role of the Thai military in the political arena. Suchit suggests that the opening of 
politics and the expansion of commercialization and industrialization have led to a 
change in military's relations with society. Economic domination is another limitation to 
the military's role in Thailand.60 To support this argument, the next chapter studies 
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Thailand’s economic crisis in 1997 and the contemporary perspectives of the Thai 
















































































III. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1997 AND THAILAND'S 
MILITARY FUNCTIONS 
Thailand unexpectedly faced an economic crisis in 1997 after enjoying an average 
of 8% growth during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This crisis infected other Asian 
countries and caused the most severe economic crisis in Thailand’s recent history. During 
the crisis, the political situation was unstable. The government was reluctant to negotiate 
economic recovery programs with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The new 
Constitution, which was being drafted, was slowed down in the parliamentary process. 
The crisis, though, led to the critics of the inefficiency of the government to deal with the 
economic and political problems. The public proposed the replacement of the Chavalit's 
administration with a new competent one. At that time, His Majesty the King, who was 
the most influential actor in the past national crises, gave a speech that what the country 
really needed was a decent standard of living and enough to eat rather than to be an 
economic tiger.61 He implicitly advised the Thai people what direction is suitable for the 
country. 
Surprisingly, the military, which had been the most important actor in politics, did 
not step forward. In traditional crisis situations, the military would have openly blamed 
the ineffective government, and replaced it with the new technocrats. The military's 
decision in 1997 not to intervene, according to the foreign source, was a "miracle."62 
Moreover, after the crisis was lessening, the military continues a reform under the 
civilian Defense Minister. These actions are, therefore, the focus of this chapter. 
  This chapter studies the perspectives of the military after the 1992 protest and 
during 1997 economic crisis. It approaches the responses from the military when there 
was a demand to change the government. This chapter starts with a review of the political 
and economic backgrounds of Thailand after the military had been forced to withdraw 
from the political scene in the 1992 demonstration. Next, the chapter presents a timeline  
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of the economic crisis and the military’s decision in this event. Then, it analyzes and 
addresses the new perspectives of the Thai officers. Finally, this chapter supports the 
argument in the previous chapter that the shift of power in Thai society has limited the 
role of the Thai Armed Forces in the political arena. 
 
A. THE MILITARY AFTER 1992 
After the military stepped down in 1992 and the election took place, Chuan 
Leekpai, the Democrat Party's leader, became the Prime Minister. The Chuan 
government planned to restructure the Thai military and reduce its direct role in 
politics.63 In the political realm between 1992 and 1997, politics transitioned to a more 
democratic form. Thailand installed three consecutively elected governments. Even 
though, these governments were not regarded as stable since the vote-buying system 
prevailed during the election campaigns, the Armed Forces did not intervene. Regardless 
that people widely accepted an election as a political game, an election, itself, could still 
not guarantee political stability. 
 With the consensus from the public to keep the military out of politics and the 
need for political reform, the new Constitution was drafted. The Constitution hoped to 
reduce corruption and vote-buying problems in blocking the return of the Armed Forces. 
Former Prime Minister Anan, a leader for a constitutional reform, led the campaign in 
support of the "people's Constitution." In every election campaign after 1992, therefore, 
most of the parties supported the amending of the Constitution and promised to form the 
cabinet with more transparency and accountability.  
In the domestic context, civil society, one of the fundamental factors for a 
democratic system, emerged. The Thai people realized that they had the power to topple 
either illegitimate or incompetent government as successfully as in 1992. Therefore, 
demonstrations were widely seen when people both in urban and rural areas demanded 
the government to solve their problems. The Press also became more powerful. It was 
able to tarnish the government and extend less credit to corrupted politicians. Since the 
"people's Constitution" was drafted, the public anticipated that the new Constitution 
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would not only help resolve the political problems but also strengthen the civil societies. 
Article 39 of the Constitution states: 
A person shall enjoy the liberty to express his or her opinion, make 
speeches, write, print, publicize, and make expression by other means. The 
restriction on liberty shall not be imposed except by virtue of the 
provisions of the law specifically enacted for the purpose of maintaining 
the security of the State, safeguarding the rights, liberties, dignity, 
reputation, family or privacy right of other person, maintaining public 
order or good morals or preventing the deterioration of the mind or health 
of the public.64 
In the Armed Forces, the officers respected their chain of command. Chiefs of the 
Armed Forces occasionally informed the public that the military supported a democracy 
and would not be involved in political affairs no matter how bad the political situation 
would become.65 The public’s protest in 1992 led the military to readjust its role in 
society. Since 1992, the military has been convinced that the best strategy was to keep 
away from direct political involvement. Today, the old style coups are no longer 
appropriate. Moreover, some senior officers agree that the military's roles in politics have 
become more complex66 and the old style authoritarianism is not accepted by the more 
educated Thai middle class.  
In order to achieve a better image, the military supported a new Constitution and 
supported the reform. The new role of the military, as an apolitical institution after 1992, 
has gradually improved the military’s reputation. Together with the forgiving 
characteristic of Thai society, relations between the military and its people had improved. 
Nonetheless, the stages of democratic consolidation were not easily accomplished 
without economic prosperity. The economic crisis in 1997 seriously questioned 
Thailand's political institution. The question for the public, business sectors, the press and 
the military was whether to continue with political reform or return to the old style of 
authoritarianism in order to resolve economic problems by an effective government.  
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B. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE THAI MILITARY'S RESPONSES    
This section does not intend to seek the main causes of the crisis itself; rather it 
observes the consequences of the financial crisis on Thailand's military functions. The 
following paragraphs, though, review the background of the crisis and then discuss the 
impact of the economic crisis and the responses from the Thai military.  
During the early 1990s, domestic and international investors had high confidence 
in the Thai economy, but since the mid 1996 the economy had started to be in trouble. 
The economy slowed down and the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) steadily fell.67 
The external debt generated by the private sector had raised from 28.8 billion dollars in 
1990 (33.8 percent of GDP) to 90.5 billion dollars in 1993 (50.9 percent of GDP).68 A 
lack of transparency of the financial institutions in managing capital flows together with 
the corruption among businessmen-politicians had created a financial bubble.69 
Moreover, the unstable governments of Banharn (1995-96) and Chavalit (1996-97) 
undermined the confidence of foreign and domestic investors.70 Subsequent to the lack of 
confidence in the Thai economy, the speculators attacked the value of the baht in the 
financial market.  
According to the government’s intervention, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) spent 
more than 30 billion dollars of foreign reserves in defending Thai currency. Finally, on 
July 2, 1997, the Thai government gave up and officially devalued the baht. Immediately, 
the government asked for the IMF recovery package.71 After negotiations, in August, 
Thailand adopted the IMF “austerity programs” with disagreement from the nationalists 
that the government was "selling the country."72   
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Two days before devaluing the baht, Prime Minister Chavalit stated that the Thai 
economy had passed its lowest point and the baht would not be devalued.73 However, the 
government spent a vast amount of reserves in order to protect the currency. With 
pressure from the export groups and some business sectors, Chavalit let the baht float on 
July 2. Then in late July, Thailand sought assistance from the IMF and announced a plan 
for economic recovery on August 5. After being devalued, the exchange rate of Thai baht 
(THB) jumped from around 25 baht per dollar to the low of around 53 baht in early 1998. 
Fifty-six finance companies had to be closed and over half of all bank assets were Non-
Performing Loans (NPLs).74 The crisis affected not only the economic institutions but 
also the Thai people. During this period, the number of crimes and suicides were reported 
as being higher.75 Consequently, there was a broad consensus to change Chavalit’s 
administration.76 Many people wanted the new cabinet to be more effective in dealing 
with the crisis.  
Shortly after Thailand announced its tough economic reform on the advice of the 
IMF in early August, the rumors of a military coup circulated. The rumors affected the 
financial market. The investors speculated the probable economic policy if a coup 
happened;77 therefore, they were reluctant to invest. Meanwhile, Thailand needed foreign 
money to help improve its economic condition. Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh 
had to promise the public after the rumors, “I can reassure the public that the government 
has closely monitored the armed forces and there will be no coup d'etat as far as I am still 
in charge.”78  
A few days after the rumors, Prime Minister Chavalit attended a luncheon with a 
group of top generals at the Army headquarters. The meeting according to the Press came 
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after the military suspected cuts in the military budget. General Chettha Thanajaro, Army 
Commander-in-Chief, stated he had already invited Chaiyawat Wibulswasdi, Governor of 
the Bank of Thailand, to brief the Armed Forces’ leaders about the economic crisis and 
defense budget matters. According to General Chavalit, the meeting was only “a get- 
together” between him as a Defense Minister and his subordinates.79  
In early August, General Sunthorn Kongsompong, chairman of the NPKC in the 
1991 coup, said that the economic problems and soaring price of basic commodities were 
the causes for the military to topple a government. He also contended that if General 
Chavalit, a former Army Commander-in-Chief and Supreme Commander, was not the 
head of the government, the military would stage a coup.80 Meanwhile, the Army 
Commander-in-Chief repeatedly refused the possibility of a military coup while further 
stating that a coup would deepen the crisis. He insisted, "As long as I am the Army Chief, 
there will not be a coup."81 General Mongkol, the Supreme Commander, also warned, 
"Soldiers no longer think of staging a coup. Problems have to be solved in parliament and 
not by force. There are much better alternatives."82 Even General Prem, the former 
premier and now the Privy Councilor, who has been widely respected among the military 
and politicians, advised Prime Minister Chavalit and the chiefs of the Armed Forces to 
"put our country above everything else."83 Due to his broad experiences both in military 
and politics, General Prem implicitly gave the final word for the military not to directly 
intervene.  
Although the military did not directly intervene, the importance of the Armed 
Forces did not lessen in political decision-making during the crisis. Subsequent to the 
pressure from the opposition parties, the press and people, General Chavalit reshuffled 
his cabinet on August 15, 1997. He, however, sought the support and approval from the 
Armed Forces.84 Another important issue was the process of passing a new Constitution. 
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During the election campaign in early 1996, General Chavalit promised to pass the new 
Constitution. However, the faction in his cabinet needed some charters to be amended. 
Since Chavalit delayed votes for the Constitution, the military chiefs came again to 
persuade him to accelerate the parliamentary process of passing the new Constitution 
before the situation worsened. The senior officer's decision to support the Constitution, 
which directly affects the military's power helped to improve the images of the military 
institution as a whole.  Because at that time, many Thais believed that the only way to 
restore the economy were to clean up the political system and eradicate corruption, the 
new Constitution would meet their expectations.85  
Nevertheless, a fear of a military coup did not diminish under unstable politics 
and economics. In September 1997, the Press quoted a comment from the Army Chief of 
Staff in the Army College seminar on development strategy and political reform. The 
quote read, "the military would be the last to react but would not let the country be 
destabilized."86 Shortly after the report, General Charn Boonprasert, Army Chief of Staff, 
had to deny that he did not state a possibility of a military coup.87 Additionally, in mid-
September the military began moving the troops into the capital for the military 
ceremony. With rumors of a coup, the military took the unusual step of informing the 
public that troops’ movements in Bangkok were no cause for a coup and requested the 
people not to panic.88 Having experienced seventeen military coups since 1932, the 
public could not easily forget movement of tanks and guns in the capital.               
According to the IMF, the defense budget was the main target for cutting rather 
than education, social welfare, and infrastructure development. The economic crisis 
attacked the military interest by immediately reducing more than a quarter of the defense 
budget. Surprisingly, the military accepted the government's fiscal policy. Arm trades 
were suspended. Some were cancelled, such as the buying of eight F/A-18 fighter jets 
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from the United States.89 Moreover, the services anticipated a 75 percent reduction in the 
number of generals over the next ten years.90 Responding to demands to reduce the 
budget and armed purchases, General Chetta stated, "Regional countries have become 
similarly bruised and exhausted from the economic crisis. Nobody can think about war 
now."91 The Armed Forces appreciated the country's situation showing the public that 
they would try to help as much as possible.    
The Chavalit's government was widely criticized for its incompetence in handing 
the crisis and its reluctance in voting for the new Constitution. With pressure from many 
sectors, Prime Minister Chavalit resigned in early November 1997. However, before his 
resignation, a new Constitution was ratified. Chuan Leekpai, the opposition party's 
leader, formed the coalition and took office on November 15th. Chuan installed his own 
economic team and promised to bring the country out of the crisis. Chuan as the Prime 
Minister also controlled the Ministry of Defense. For the second time, since Prime 
Minister Seni Pramoj, who took this office only 44 days before the military coup in 1976, 
the Ministry of Defense had a civilian at the top.92 When taking his office, Chuan stated 
that the military must continue institutional reform.93 In October 1998, Chuan intervened 
in the promotion process, a critical issue in Thailand. He appointed General Surayud 
Chulanont to be the Army Commander-in-Chief. General Surayudh's background has 
been as a professional officer, who also has a close relationship with Privy Councilor 
Prem. When taking the position, he stated that his policies were to disengage the Army 
from politics and make it a more professional service.94 He further stated his vision in the 
first interview with the press, "The new Army will abide by orders of the civilian 
government and by instructions of the Defense Minister who is vested with the power to 
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be the highest authority of all military men."95 After this serious crisis of no military 
coup, the military continues its reform. 
 
C. THE MILITARY'S PERSPECTIVES DURING AND AFTER THE 
ECONOMIC CRISIS 
Chonlathis employed an economic perspective on the role of budget constraint 
when analyzing the consequences of the financial crisis on the Thai military. In his thesis, 
he concludes that the financial crisis caused the Thai Armed Forces to restructure their 
organizations.96 With this budget constraint, the military had to reduce its personnel and 
some ineffective organizations. However, whether or not the reform is accomplished 
depends on the Thai military's views of the country's political and economic situation. 
This section, therefore, further studies the impact of the economic crisis on Thailand’s 
military functions in the political arena and analyzes the military's perspectives in the 
relationship between economics and politics.         
Analytically, the main reasons for the military not staging a coup in 1997 are the 
following: 
1. The military does not know much about the macroeconomic policy and how to 
handle a financial crisis since the world is rapidly changing in the areas of information 
technology and capital flows. Additionally, the military coup in the past had avoided 
interfering in the economic policy and left the technocrats to manage the economy. 
Without professional knowledge in running the national economy, a military coup in 
1997, therefore, would have worsened the crisis. The economic community especially the 
investors would have had little faith in an economic policy by the military regime. Since 
the country needs money to reboot the national economy, undermining foreign investors 
in the international market by replacing the existing government with a military coup 
would be a suicidal action.  
2. The crisis did not directly affect military interest other than the possibility of a 
budget cut. The Thai military was still able to maintain its interests, such as in operating 
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television and radio stations. After 1992, the military tried to restore its reputation. 
Showing concern for the country’s economic situation in 1997 would have been a better 
strategy. In addition, the government of General Chawalit had a good relationship with 
the military. He mediated the critical issues between the politicians and the chiefs of the 
Armed Forces. The most notable point was the government’s explanation and 
compromise in the defense budget cut. 
3. The new Constitution was drafted. The military coup was an opponent to the 
new democratic system. In addition, the urban groups, which preferred a democratic 
system, would have protested the military regime like in the 1992 event. Moreover, since 
former Prime Minister Anan Punyarachun, who is highly respected in Thai society, was 
the leader of the Constitution’s draft, he would have opposed the military’s intervention. 
Therefore, in 1997, the military did not have public support in directly intervening.  
In the case of the decision of the Thai military in 1997, every reason mutually 
supported each other; therefore, one reason was no more important than another. Since 
this thesis has focused on the impact of global economic integration on the functions of 
the Thai military, it did not find either foreign investors or international trade as the most 
important factor in directly limiting the military's decision.  
Some may also argue that the military did not decide to intervene due to 
Chavalit's dominance. During the crisis, General Chavalit was a prime minister and 
defense minister. He put his supporters in the important positions of the Armed Forces. 
Therefore, he was able to control the situation. This point, however, became clear in the 
following year that there was a shift of political power, when Prime Minister Chuan 
appointed General Surayudh, a reformer, to be Army Chief, the most powerful position in 
the Armed Forces. The appointment of General Surayudh could be regarded as the power 
shift that strengthened the authority of elected civilians. This appointment was also the 
signal that civilian politicians openly wanted to bring the military under their “control.” 
During the economic crisis, Thailand's desire to be a part of the world economy 
did not decrease. Thailand still needed the market for exporting goods and receiving 
capital and technological flows in order to boost the national growth. Therefore, a 
military coup in 1997 would have worsened its economic situation. For example, the IMF 
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would not have given any monetary support to the military government. In the political 
realm, in 1997, the new Constitution was being voted on by the parliament. The public 
believed that the new Constitution would bring an effective political system. Since 
stability in a political system would also help resolve economic problems, people wanted 
to wait and see the result of the new system under a new Constitution rather than give this 
opportunity to the Armed Forces.  
Since the 1997 crisis originated from the ineffectiveness of the governments and 
corruptive styles of the cabinets, the military could have justified upon intervening before 
the new Constitution, which rejected a military coup, had been voted. But, the military 
did not intervene because the military itself could not guarantee that the national 
economy would recover. Moreover, today, the world community does not recognize a 
military regime as a legitimated government. Thailand’s neighbor, Myanmar, which is 
controlled by the military regime, is a good example of the economic sanctions. A coup 
in 1997, therefore, would have a little support and it would disrupt the democratic system 
that the Thai people needed. 
Therefore, in the military's responses during the crisis, senior officers had helped 
to improve the military's image and political situation by remaining cooperative. They 
also frequently have guaranteed the public that the military would let the politicians take 
care of the economic issues. Meanwhile, the military strengthened its roles in drug 
operations, border disputes, and the United Nation's mission in East Timor. With these 
responses, Suchit stated, "Democracy is advancing, and generals have proved they aren't 
very good at handling economic crises like the one we're facing now."97 Economic crises 
are complex, global matters that are well beyond the military's ability to cope with as in a 
decade ago. Therefore, the military defers to the technocrats.98 
In sum, since the military's image improved after 1992, a coup in 1997 would 
have diminished its prerogatives from society. As a result, the military let the politicians 
to solve the problems. The responses of the military created a new role for the Thai  
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military in domestic politics. The contemporary military’s political perspective is to 
compromise with politicians and business elites. Although the middle-class, a new social 
force since the 1992 protest, did not have much influence during the crisis, they carefully 
observed the political and economic conditions. 
In Thailand, power among the domestic actors now transfers to elected 
politicians. The international economy as an external force influences domestic actors in 
accelerating the emerging of the middle class needed for political participation. 
Nonetheless, Thailand’s economic crisis shows that the military’s influence in Thailand's 
political arena has not been completely diminished. In a limited manner, the military 
carefully influenced the political event in 1997.   
Direct involvement of the Thai military is unlikely in the near future; however, a 
fear of a military coup is not eliminated. Institutional reform would be the best approach 
to guarantee that the military will not challenge the new Constitution. Along with the 
rapidly changing global economic environment and the changing of the national security, 
the new military has to readjust its roles and missions. The next chapter, though, will 
discuss the possibility of reform in the Armed Forces, the dilemma between liberalizing 
the economy and the national security, and the prospects of civil-military relations in 
Thailand in the future. It will finally address the effect of the international economy on 













IV. MILITARY REFORM AND THE PROSPECTS OF CIVIL-
MILITARY RELATIONS IN THAILAND 
Chapter II discussed the reasons for a military coup staged in 1991. Then, chapter 
III addressed the reasons why the Thai military decided not to directly intervene during 
the economic crisis in 1997. This chapter analyzes the economic impact on military 
reform and the prospects of civil and military relations. It focuses on military reform in 
order to clarify whether or not the reform could change the Thai military into more 
“professional.” It, then, discusses the dilemma of liberalizing the economy and 
maintaining national security, and the prospects of civil-military relations in Thailand.   
 
A. MILITARY REFORM AFTER THE ECONOMIC CRISIS   
Military reform has been widely discussed since the military crushed the public 
demonstration in 1992. The pictures of the soldiers firing at the Thai people, who were 
not their enemies, led the public to demand a modification of the military organization. 
The reform concentrated on the traditional and apolitical roles of the Thai military. The 
reform has continued to be discussed in the Armed Forces after the economic crisis. As 
stated earlier, when Thailand faced the economic crisis, it passed a new Constitution. The 
Constitution appreciated the continuation of the institutional reform. Article 72 of the 
new Constitution defined the role of the Armed Forces as "upholding independence and 
maintaining security of the State, institution of kingship, national interests and the 
democratic regime of government with the King as Head of the State, and for national 
development."99 According to the Constitution, the military's main duty is national 
security. It can only be used in domestic mission to support national development. 
However, the reform has not been an easy task to be accomplished. The long dominance 
of the military, especially the Army, in Thai society, could have hindered the reform. 
 The Army, once the largest and most powerful organization, consists of around 
700 generals at the top with more than 70 percent of the Army’s budget going to its 
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personnel.100 Reforming the Army to become more professional and efficient, therefore, 
includes reducing a number of the generals by 75 percent and downsizing a number of 
the Army personnel from 230,000 to 190,000 men in the next ten year. The reform also 
intends to eliminate the involvement of some of the military officers in illegal businesses. 
In the educational system, the military academy will reduce its academic years from 5 to 
4 years.101 The "radical reform" proposes an end to the conscription system. In addition, 
the reform gives foreign authority to the Foreign Ministry while the military takes care of 
their subordinates and abides by civilian government.102  
 The reform also includes the privatization of the military's main business in radio 
and television stations. In Article 40, the Constitution states that radio and television 
frequencies are national communication resources for public interests.103 The military’s 
221 radio stations and two television channels, therefore, should be used for public 
purposes according to the Constitution. Since the military has leased these radio stations 
to private operators and military personnel have operated one television channel, these 
radio and television stations are one of its main monetary resources. For instance, the 
military receives more than 30 million baht annually for each radio channel's lease.104 
Although the military argues that it wants to protect the stations for "national security" 
reasons, the reform is trying to eliminate the military's monopolization. 
General Surayudh's plan for the reform was to increase transparency in the 
military's commercial radio and television operations by subjecting their financial results 
to public scrutiny. He has even agreed to the military relinquishing its control over some 
of the stations and returning a portion of the revenue to the government's treasury.105 
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These reforms are on going and the struggles from the conservative factions will be 
widely seen. For example, some officers, who have been involved in illegal business, are 
the main faction, which does not support the reform. Patinan Wattanayagorn, former 
security advisor to the former Prime Minister Chuan, stated, "Many conservative officers 
want to backtrack and return to the good old day."106  
In defining military reform, Alfred Stephan, in the 1970s, described the new 
military professionalism as interrelated political and military skills. The military is 
concerned with internal security, and focuses on national development. Meanwhile, the 
old professionalism of Samuel Huntington, in the 1950s, described the military as an 
apolitical institution that is subject to civilian authority and professionally managed 
violence from external, international sources.107 Both new and old professionalism have a 
common perspective in which the military does not involve itself in political affairs. 
Huntington, himself, states, "The dark ages of military political influence were the golden 
ages of military professionalism."108  
In order to professionalize the Thai military, the reform should be not only 
downsize the organization but also educate “the rule of law” in the military. Military 
personnel, as members in society, participate in politics because each has one vote in an 
election. Totally separating military personnel from political knowledge easily guides or 
leads to political objectives by the senior commander. Therefore, as an institution, the 
Thai military separates itself from politics in order to add professionalism to the military. 
On the other hand, as members of society, military personnel should have the right to 
independently select and vote for their political preferences.  
Being in power for a very long time, the Thai military has penetrated every sector 
in society. Pulling the military out of politics and professionalizing them will not be an 
immediate task. The success of the reform, though, is not being seen yet. Moreover, the 
reform is not supported by the contemporary national security. When comparing Thai 
military power with the Burmese military, Thailand has cut the defense budget and 
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downsized military personnel, while Burma’s defense budget has not been reduced and 
its personnel include almost 400,000 in the military.109 The recent tension between 
Thailand and Burma is, therefore, the obstacle of the continuation of the reform. The next 
section provides an analysis of the security reasons and the liberalized economy. 
Developing an argument that liberalizes the economy creates institutional reform, but 
security is also an important criterion to maintain. Meeting the security criteria is an 
important prospect of Thailand's civil-military relations.   
 
B. A LIBERALIZED ECONOMY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
According to national security, during the Cold War, Thailand's strategy focused 
on its eastern borders, which are composed of pro-Vietnamese Laos and pro-Chinese 
Khmer Rouge. Thailand's national security was seriously concerned about a communist 
threat when Cambodia had been taken by Vietnamese troops in the late 1970s. At that 
time, the eastern borders were Thailand’s main theatre for military defense.  
Subsequent to the declining dominance of Vietnam in the late 1980s along with 
the end of the Cold War, Thailand's national security concerns shifted to its western 
neighbor—Burma (Myanmar). Thailand and Burma share common border of some 2,532 
kilometers; however, some parts of the border have not been demarcated properly since 
colonization by Britain and France. Along the border, there are 76 routes allowing easy 
cross-border passages. Moreover, the border areas are composed of thick evergreen forest 
and mountainous terrain, suitable for building up military bases of minority groups and 
for harboring the production of narcotics and arms trade. The minorities, especially the 
Karens and Shans, provided a buffer zone between the two countries during the Cold 
War. When the Cold War ended, the minorities in Burma become a security concern for 
Thailand, especially in drug trafficking along the border. Additionally, these minorities 
cause tensions between Thailand and Burma's security. 
Burma has been controlled by the military regime since 1988. Since the State 
Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has an aggressive policy towards the minorities 
and democratic movements, the minorities and anti-Rangoon groups started to base their 
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insurgencies in Thailand to achieve their political objectives. With more than 600,000 
unregistered Burmese immigrants living in Thailand110 and refugee camps composed of 
more than 100,000 Karennis, Karens and Mons along the Thai border,111 these groups 
often committed criminal and terrorist attacks on Thai soil. For example, on October 1, 
1999, five armed Burmese men captured 38 hostages at the Burmese Embassy in 
Bangkok demanding the Burmese Government to release all political prisoners in Burma 
and to recognize the result of the 1990 election. Although the incident was resolved 
peacefully, the SPDC was disappointed with Thailand policies toward "the hostage-
takers" in which Thailand called "student activists fighting for democracy." Burma 
temporarily closed its border trading posts and fisheries to the Thais opposing Thailand's 
policy.112 In December 1999, ten terrorists, calling themselves, "God's Army" seized 
hundreds of hostages at Ratchaburi hospital in Thailand.113 Although, the Thai Special 
Forces resolved the situation by killing all of the terrorists, Thailand started to become 
seriously concerned with its domestic security regarding minorities and anti-Rangoon 
groups along the border. The economic benefit from border trade led Thailand attempt to 
peacefully resolve the problems. 
According to the liberalized policy of Thailand's economy during the 1980s 
following the decline of the communist threat in the region, Thailand opened its 
economic policies toward its neighbors. Thailand's Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan 
proposed to turn the Indo-Chinese battleground into a trading market.114 Moreover, the 
Suwannaphume (Golden Land) concept, the regional economic cooperation in mainland 
Southeast Asia, was headed by Thailand in the late 1980s and early 1990s.115  
During Chatichai’s administration, General Chavalit Yongchaiyut, the Defense 
Minister of Thailand, visited Rangoon (Yangon), the capital of Burma, to negotiate 
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logging and fishing deals for Thai companies in 1988.116 Nonetheless, the motives for an 
economic rapprochement toward Burma were mainly commercial. Thai generals only had 
an interest in Burma’s timber and gems trade. Since 1988 the military chiefs have had a 
direct relationship with Burmese leaders. With this personal relationship, the joint-
investment contracts to build roads and dams in Burma mainly came from the private 
visit of General Chavalit, Thailand’s Defense Minister, during July 23-24, 2001. The 
project has been criticized because it involves the Thai military in business.117 A direct 
military-military relationship also seems opposing to the reform proposal by using a 
diplomatic channel in the Foreign Minister's framework on security issues.     
Although a liberalized economy and regional economic cooperation can boost 
economic growth, Thailand as a country among different political systems of its 
neighbors, has had difficulty rapidly opening its economy. Laos is still a communist state. 
Myanmar is controlled by the military regime. Cambodia, although it had a democratic 
government since 1993, faced the coup led by Prime Minister Hun Sen in July 1997. 
Only Malaysia seems close to the same path as Thailand. However, the Muslim 
separatists still operate between Thailand and Malaysia’s borders. Although, all of these 
countries are members of the ASEAN community, the questionable national securities 
among these countries are of main concern in economic cooperation. As Stephen Brooks 
analyzes, "while ASEAN countries are not hostile toward each other their relationships 
are certainly not as free of security suspicions."118 
Figure 2 shows the trade offs between economic integration, nation-state, and 
mass politics. In this scenario, when two preferences are chosen the third option must be 
sacrificed. To liberalize the national economy and promote mass politics diminishes the 
state's power. Eroding a power of the state also means national security becomes less 
significant. However, to strengthen the state's power by liberalizing the economy, mass 
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politics, which is important for democratic system, will be less important. The dilemma 
causes both civilian representatives and military officers to discuss Thailand's future.     
 












Thailand had become part of the world economy in the 1980s. However, the 
economic crisis in 1997 questioned its economic policies. The present impact of 
economic integration on the military reform, though, is unclear since the economic crisis 
has not been alleviated and the government has not resolved domestic problems. 
Additionally, national security brings a serious question for the civilian government.  A 
dilemma of a liberalized economy and national security challenges the politicians and the 
Chiefs of the Armed Forces to justify Thailand's policy.  
As a result of the dilemma between the liberalized economy and national security 
in Thailand, the civilian government and the military have a mission to define the 
national strategy in order to maintain economic growth and uphold national security. This 
will be an appropriate prospect of Thailand's civil-military relations.    
 
 
C. THE PROSPECTS FOR THAILAND'S CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
This section argues that military reform and a liberalized economy cannot be 
immediately achieved due to some reasons of national security. As a result, the 
politicians and the Chiefs of the Armed Forces have to develop a framework in order to 
improve civil-military relations in Thailand in the future.  
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The different views between the politicians and senior military officers on 
security issues were evident during the skirmish along the Thai-Burmese border. In 
February 2001, clashes along the Mae Sai-Tachilek border in the northern part of 
Thailand occurred, while the Burmese Army was fighting with the Shan State Army 
(SSA). The Burmese troops fired weapons and followed the retreating SSA in Thailand 
and Burma's disputed territory. The incident left five civilians dead and dozens 
injured.120 The Thai Army immediately responded by firing back and ordered the 
Burmese Army to withdraw. Tensions between the two sides lasted until June when there 
was an exchange visit between the Thai Prime Minister and the Burmese leader.  
The conflict between Thailand and Burma in 2001 not only created tension 
between the two countries but also resulted in a sour relationship between the civilian 
government and the military. The main actors were Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra 
and the Third Army Commander, Lieutenant General Watthanachai Chaimuanwong. 
While Lt. Gen Watthanachai, in charge of the conflict area, took a tough line against 
Burma, Prime Minister Thaksin took a diplomatic approach under the Foreign Ministry’s 
framework. According to a poll, 57% of the people said Thailand should adopt aggressive 
measures to solve the problem while 41.7% of the people demanded the use of a flexible 
approach and compromise.121 This issue created different views for the public. One 
group supported the military approach while the other advocated the civilian government. 
Finally, the government and the military compromised. On May 4, 2001, Thailand's 
newspaper, the Nation quoted Prime Minister Thaksin, "the government is trying to get 
the military and the Foreign Ministry to work toward the same direction."122  
This event is the focal point of the prospect of civil-military relations in Thailand. 
The compromise between civilian and military personnel will be openingly discussed in 
the near future. The military will be less aggressive towards the government's policy and 
the elected civilians will be more respectful of the military's position of authority. 
Thailand and Burma conflict is a guiding issue in Thailand’s civil-military relations.  
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Thai-Burma problems also exemplify the dilemma between economic cooperation 
and security issues.123 While the business sector needs to maintain economic cooperation 
between the Burmese junta and Thai businessmen, the military cannot sacrifice its 
security criteria. In my opinion, when opening the country to the region and the world for 
economic prosperity, the issue of national security becomes more important not less 
important. Opening the country results in internationally-organized crimes, illegal 
immigrants and drug trafficking, which affect the society as a whole. Therefore, both 
issues of a liberalized economy and national security should be a concern in Thailand's 
civil-military relations.    
Good civil-military relations in Thailand, therefore, do not mean either sacrificing 
national security for economic growth or closing the country in order to uphold national 
security. Since the political system in Thailand has given the authority to the elected 
politicians, the system needs the professional representatives to manage the national 
issues. Moreover, if these elected civilians want to control the military, they have to 
become more knowledgeable in national security. Although the contemporary Thais do 
not want the military to become involved in politics, they also do not want to see 
corrupted politicians in the Cabinet or an impotent government.  
Since the military has withdrawn from the scene, Thailand's democratic 
consolidation now depends on the Government to be able to prove that it is professional 
in various issues. Moreover, politics must have more transparency and accountability. If 
these criteria cannot be accomplished, the old guard will have legitimacy to restore 
"national unity and stability." Although, the lesson learned in 1992 led the military to 
readjust its role in society, the Thai military will not completely withdraw from politics if 
political problems, such as vote-buying system, money politics are not resolved. As 
Patinan stated, "The army has moved from a crude and violent way to a more 
sophisticated level of participation. The military is just finding a new role, which receives 
more popular support."124 Because the Thai military has dominated the political system 
since the 1932 Revolution, any political instability could bring them in at any time.  
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Integrating civil-military relations, at this time, should go further in professional 
education and training. Education will facilitate every sector in understanding each 
other's roles. Civilians will concern themselves with national security while the military 
will support the elected civilians' duties. Although, today, at a national level, Thailand 
has the National Defense College and the Strategic Studies Institute of the Supreme 
Command collaborated a one-year program, for senior military, bureaucrats and, 
especially, businessmen, no educational program exist for the middle-ranking officers 
and civilians. Moreover, education for the cadets and college students is not widely 
provided. Therefore, education to support civil-military relations should be established at 
every level. Education and training will strengthen the professional ethos of the military 
and promote good relations between the military and the civilian. 
Thailand's politics, economics and education are very important in consolidating 
democracy. Every mechanism supports each other. As Thailand becomes a complex 
society with different preferences among domestic actors, military coups or the military's 
direct intervention may not be seen in the near future. However, if military reform is not 
accomplished and the political problems are not resolved, the military can be justified in 
taking back power.    
Without a doubt, the global economy is one of the important factors that has 
influenced Thailand's domestic politics by creating the middle class. This group will be 
the significant variable for the direction of Thailand's democracy. This thesis focuses on 
the impact of economic integration of the functions of the Thai military. It has not found 
a direct link between the global economy conditions and the role of the Thai military in 
the political arena. Therefore, both during the period of economic growth and the 
economic crisis in 1997 are not relate to the Thai military's interest.  
However, economic growth brings new social forces into political participation.  
These groups formed by the middle class mainly affect the military’s domestic role. As 
long as, these groups become larger and more powerful, military dominance in politics 
will gradually decrease. In addition, without the military's familiarity in managing the 
national economy and the rapid change of the global economy, the Thai military has 
deferred the power to the elected politicians.  
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Thailand's military institution has stood beside the gradual transitioning of 
democracy since 1932. The past sixty years demonstrates that military dominance in 
politics narrowed democratic participation with the military moving away from their 
traditional roles. Today is the opportune time to encourage the military to be more 
professional in their careers and to allow the Thai people to choose their own 
representatives. In my view, individuals are rational thinkers, who calculate the cost and 
its benefit. If the citizens of Thailand think that their votes will benefit them, they will 
vote for individuals or parties that they prefer. The military as an institution is only the 




































































The theoretical framework proposed by Garrette and Lange (1996) is used as a 
basis for interpreting the change of the Thai Armed Forces' role in the political arena after 
integrating the economic system with the global economy during the 1980s.  This theory 
explains that a change in international economic conditions can lead to a change in the 
preference of domestic actors in any country. This ultimately results in the shift of power 
in that country.  
The growth of Thailand's economy, after integrating its economic system with the 
world economy, has caused the emergence of the middle class. Another group, 
businessmen, who also have powerful social and governmental status, is the group 
involving in global businesses. These business groups have gradually attained power 
once monopolized by the Thai military. This has initiated the conflict between business 
groups and the military. The 1991 coup demonstrated the military's resistance to the 
change. Although the coup was successful, and power was again back in the military's 
hand, the military shortly after had to step down due to the middle class's demonstration 
in 1992 resisting the prospective monopolization by the military again. Since then, 
Thailand has become a complex society. There have been more and more actors, eager to 
participate in the political game with an increase of demands for their preferences. The 
middle class has been seen as one of the new significant actors since 1992, and has tried 
to attain their domestic power after this demonstration. They have also had to compete 
with the business groups, who once attained such power after Thailand's economic 
integration. While these groups have struggled to gain domestic power, the military 
secretly monitored the situation.  
Thailand's economic crisis in 1997 did not lead to the coup, because many factors 
had limited the role of the military. For instances, the military was not confident of its 
ability to run the country's macroeconomics. The military's interests were minimally 
affected by the economic situation. During the economic crisis, the Prime Minister, who 
was the former Army's Commander-in-Chief, had readily compromised the potential 
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conflict between the government and the military. Most importantly, the new 
Constitution made illegal any self-appointed or appointed Prime Minister. Although their 
involvement was not obvious, it is evident that the military's influence on Thailand's 
politics existed during the crisis.  
The above incidents also led to the reformation of the military institution from its 
prior roles to the real professional soldiers beginning around 1992. However, this is still 
not accomplished, because of the differences in the point of views. That is the concept of 
national stability between elected politicians and military leaders on the liberalization of 
the Thai economy. The elected politicians believe that economic growth leads to the 
stability and development of the country; but the military personnel conservatively view 
the rapid opening of the country to the global economy as a possibly jeopardizing 
national security. This dilemma has become the problem for both parties. Nonetheless, 
because the military has been less aggressive with the elected civilian, the potential of 
both parties compromising their interests is highly likeable in the near future. The 
outcome of this dilemma is also principally depended upon the political steering from the 
middle class. 
Without the public involvement, political rivalries in Thailand, since 1932, had 
been in the hands of the military and business elites. The economic growth has created 
the new middle class taking the lead in the political arena. This shift of domestic power 
resulted in limiting the role of the Thai military in politics. Regardless of this, the 
prerogatives of the Thai military are still recognized by the Thai people because of the 
social and economic development and national stability that had occurred during the 
earlier military rule. When the country was confronted with the economic crisis in 1997, 
people still thought about national stability during those years. 
 The above discussion infers that economic prosperity, political stability, and 
public education are the key factors for the existence of a democratic system in Thailand. 
Economic prosperity also gave rise to the Thai middle class. After becoming involved in 
limiting the military power in 1992, the roles of the middle class have significantly 
influenced the new political structure of Thailand. In the author's point of view, if and 
only if both serious political instability and a collapse of the Thai market economy are 
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uncontrollable by the existing government, then the Thai people shall demand direct 
military intervention. 
  
B. SUGGESTED FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research has only focused on the Thai military's functions after Thailand was 
integrated into the world economy. The progression of the Thai military reformation, 
mentioned in this thesis, can be followed up with further studies. These studies could 
involve the search for an optimally national-strategic model compromising the Thai 
economy and its national stability. This model could also serve as a basis of Thailand's 
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